{"id":6288,"date":"2022-01-19T06:23:24","date_gmt":"2022-01-19T06:23:36","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/mediateka.online\/learnrussian\/2014-vs-2022-ukraines-improved-but-still-longshot-odds-of-withstanding-a-full-fledged-russian-invasion.html"},"modified":"2022-01-19T06:23:24","modified_gmt":"2022-01-19T06:23:36","slug":"2014-vs-2022-ukraines-improved-but-still-longshot-odds-of-withstanding-a-full-fledged-russian-invasion","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mediateka.online\/learnrussian\/2014-vs-2022-ukraines-improved-but-still-longshot-odds-of-withstanding-a-full-fledged-russian-invasion.html","title":{"rendered":"2014 vs. 2022 Ukraine\u2019s improved but still longshot odds of withstanding a full-fledged Russian invasion"},"content":{"rendered":"<figure class=\"EmbedBlock-module_root__28k9U EmbedBlock-module_cc__1BQ5g EmbedBlock-module_full__1TEjx EmbedBlock-module_desktop__SF5a_ EmbedBlock-module_proportional__3lAv4\">Ukrainian military drills outside Kyiv on December 25, 2021Sergey Supinsky \/ AFP \/ Scanpix \/ LETA<\/figure>\n<p class=\"SimpleBlock-module_lead__35nXx  SimpleBlock-module_center__2rjif\">After last week\u2019s talks between Russia, the United States, and NATO led to no apparent breakthroughs on European security, speculation has resumed in the West that Moscow is preparing an expanded invasion of Ukraine that could begin at any time. The Kremlin denies any plans to attack Ukraine, but policymakers in Kyiv and Washington say the Russian military\u2019s buildup near Ukraine\u2019s borders suggests otherwise. Some experts in the West, including several former senior U.S. military personnel, now argue that the Ukrainian Army might be able to withstand a Russian onslaught, if it receives all feasible support from NATO. Hoping that is purely a thought experiment, Meduza reviews some of the theories about how a larger war between Russia and Ukraine could unfold.<\/p>\n<h3 class=\"SimpleBlock-module_h3__2Kv7Y  SimpleBlock-module_center__2rjif\"><strong>Ukraine\u2019s armed forces are now far more combat-effective than at the start of the war with Russia in 2014 and 2015<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p class=\"SimpleBlock-module_p__Q3azD  SimpleBlock-module_center__2rjif\">In the past seven years, Ukraine has spent more on its military than any country in the former Soviet Union except Russia. It now has the second largest army in the region, an experienced army reserve, a new command-and-control system, and a significant share of its arsenal comprises modern weapons. This would likely be sufficient to resist any assaults by the two \u201ccorps\u201d of the self-declared Donetsk and Luhansk People\u2019s Republics and even the handful of battalion tactical groups from the Russian army that have been \u201cassigned\u201d to the region.<\/p>\n<p class=\"SimpleBlock-module_p__Q3azD  SimpleBlock-module_center__2rjif\">During the last active phase of the war, the Ukrainian military twice suffered brutal defeat against a relatively small adversary, first outside Ilovaisk in August 2014 and then near Debaltseve in January and February 2015. Military leaders in Kyiv estimate that Ukrainian troops encountered six Russian battalion tactical groups, or about 4,000 soldiers. Today, this would be too few men to overcome Ukraine\u2019s armed forces.<\/p>\n<figure class=\"EmbedBlock-module_root__28k9U EmbedBlock-module_cc__1BQ5g EmbedBlock-module_default__LSDny EmbedBlock-module_proportional__3lAv4 EmbedBlock-module_isInGroupedBlock__3r_i-\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"data:image\/gif;base64,R0lGODlhAQABAIAAAAAAAP\/\/\/yH5BAEAAAAALAAAAAABAAEAAAIBRAA7\" data-src=\"\/impro\/0HwP4wyRYrfiXaXz55CsKFKPSfhhlsjzbB2S7Vn9j8Q\/fill\/325\/0\/ce\/1\/aHR0cHM6Ly9tZWR1\/emEuaW8vaW1hZ2Uv\/YXR0YWNobWVudHMv\/aW1hZ2VzLzAwNy80\/MTYvNTk4L29yaWdp\/bmFsL1RHMHJZYWxh\/TTJMZm5mU3hiMDBj\/UHcuanBn.jpg\" class=\"lazyload\" alt=\"Ukrainian soldiers entering Debaltseve on February 3, 2015\"><noscript><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"\/impro\/0HwP4wyRYrfiXaXz55CsKFKPSfhhlsjzbB2S7Vn9j8Q\/fill\/325\/0\/ce\/1\/aHR0cHM6Ly9tZWR1\/emEuaW8vaW1hZ2Uv\/YXR0YWNobWVudHMv\/aW1hZ2VzLzAwNy80\/MTYvNTk4L29yaWdp\/bmFsL1RHMHJZYWxh\/TTJMZm5mU3hiMDBj\/UHcuanBn.jpg\" alt=\"Ukrainian soldiers entering Debaltseve on February 3, 2015\"><\/noscript>Ukrainian soldiers entering Debaltseve on February 3, 2015Evgeny Feldman<\/figure>\n<figure class=\"EmbedBlock-module_root__28k9U EmbedBlock-module_cc__1BQ5g EmbedBlock-module_default__LSDny EmbedBlock-module_proportional__3lAv4 EmbedBlock-module_isInGroupedBlock__3r_i-\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"data:image\/gif;base64,R0lGODlhAQABAIAAAAAAAP\/\/\/yH5BAEAAAAALAAAAAABAAEAAAIBRAA7\" data-src=\"\/impro\/RZvkJ11RCjS_b1c_6pSfhGjpdoIpEwZZUVsXdljBRug\/fill\/325\/0\/ce\/1\/aHR0cHM6Ly9tZWR1\/emEuaW8vaW1hZ2Uv\/YXR0YWNobWVudHMv\/aW1hZ2VzLzAwNy80\/MTYvNjA2L29yaWdp\/bmFsL0NObGZtN2pT\/V2VtVWdTTkxvQ0dy\/MEEuanBn.jpg\" class=\"lazyload\" alt=\"A Ukrainian soldier is transferred to the hospital after being wounded outside Debaltseve on February 2, 2015\"><noscript><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"\/impro\/RZvkJ11RCjS_b1c_6pSfhGjpdoIpEwZZUVsXdljBRug\/fill\/325\/0\/ce\/1\/aHR0cHM6Ly9tZWR1\/emEuaW8vaW1hZ2Uv\/YXR0YWNobWVudHMv\/aW1hZ2VzLzAwNy80\/MTYvNjA2L29yaWdp\/bmFsL0NObGZtN2pT\/V2VtVWdTTkxvQ0dy\/MEEuanBn.jpg\" alt=\"A Ukrainian soldier is transferred to the hospital after being wounded outside Debaltseve on February 2, 2015\"><\/noscript>A Ukrainian soldier is transferred to the hospital after being wounded outside Debaltseve on February 2, 2015Evgeny Feldman<\/figure>\n<figure class=\"EmbedBlock-module_root__28k9U EmbedBlock-module_cc__1BQ5g EmbedBlock-module_super_full__1Fn9A EmbedBlock-module_proportional__3lAv4\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"data:image\/gif;base64,R0lGODlhAQABAIAAAAAAAP\/\/\/yH5BAEAAAAALAAAAAABAAEAAAIBRAA7\" data-src=\"\/impro\/YnZStSa_x0DqKK4IhF44niI-2As_hZOyfkNMP71eGwo\/fill\/325\/0\/ce\/1\/aHR0cHM6Ly9tZWR1\/emEuaW8vaW1hZ2Uv\/YXR0YWNobWVudHMv\/aW1hZ2VzLzAwNy80\/MTYvNTkwL29yaWdp\/bmFsL3ZBbTJwdGdT\/dzBtWENldFM3bmhE\/SHcuanBn.jpg\" class=\"lazyload\" alt=\"Destroyed Ukrainian armaments outside Debaltseve on March 24, 2015\"><noscript><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"\/impro\/YnZStSa_x0DqKK4IhF44niI-2As_hZOyfkNMP71eGwo\/fill\/325\/0\/ce\/1\/aHR0cHM6Ly9tZWR1\/emEuaW8vaW1hZ2Uv\/YXR0YWNobWVudHMv\/aW1hZ2VzLzAwNy80\/MTYvNTkwL29yaWdp\/bmFsL3ZBbTJwdGdT\/dzBtWENldFM3bmhE\/SHcuanBn.jpg\" alt=\"Destroyed Ukrainian armaments outside Debaltseve on March 24, 2015\"><\/noscript>Destroyed Ukrainian armaments outside Debaltseve on March 24, 2015Evgeny Feldman<\/figure>\n<h3 class=\"SimpleBlock-module_h3__2Kv7Y  SimpleBlock-module_center__2rjif\"><strong>How the Ukrainian military has grown stronger<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p>As is required for any country participating in NATO operations, Kyiv has implemented the so-called \u201cJ Structure,\u201d forming special groups tasked with intelligence, logistics, defense planning, and more. It\u2019s unclear how suited this structure is to Ukraine\u2019s military, but it\u2019s clearly superior to the old Soviet-style command-and-control structure on which Ukraine relied in 2014 and 2015, which made it impossible for Kyiv to manage its troops effectively.Active troops have been trained under a new system that is based on combat experience. Additionally, troops regularly undergo training operations at the line of contact in the Donbas, opposite the separatists. Kyiv has dramatically expanded how much it spends on these exercises, and military instructors from NATO member states are also on the ground, helping to prepare soldiers. (Moscow has demanded an end to this practice.)Ukraine now has new means of reconnaissance and target designation that it lacked in 2014 and 2015: a large fleet of modern unmanned aerial drones, counter-battery radars (which can locate the origin of artillery projectiles), and more. Kyiv is also now receiving intelligence data from NATO members that recently started deploying advanced battlefield reconnaissance and target designation equipment over Ukraine, including the E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft.To complement its new targeting capacity, the Ukrainian military has also started manufacturing new precision-guided munitions.Kyiv has largely replaced its small, inefficient fleet of military aircraft (in 2014, this was first and foremost Ukraine\u2019s Mi-24 helicopters and Su-25 jets) with TB2 combat UAVs from the Turkish manufacturer Bayraktar. This weapon (along with other UAVs) was arguably the pillar of Azerbaijan\u2019s decisive victory in the 2020 war for control of Nagorno Karabakh. Ukraine has already bought 48 Turkish UAVs (apparently more than Azerbaijan, which used less than 20 of these machines in Karabakh). Kyiv has also ordered another 24 Turkish UAVs and recently signed a contract for licensed domestic production of the Bayraktar TB2.Ukrainian combat units now have a large supply of modern, portable anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). First, there\u2019s the American FGM-148 Javelin. So far, Kyiv has received roughly 47 launchers from the United States and an unknown number from Estonia, as well as 180 missiles. Second, Ukraine has 200 launchers and thousands of missiles for its own Stugna-P system. In 2014 and 2015, the Ukrainian infantry packed far less firepower.<\/p>\n<p class=\"SimpleBlock-module_p__Q3azD  SimpleBlock-module_center__2rjif\">All this should be enough for Ukrainian troops to withstand another military operation designed \u201cto force negotiations\u201d (like the one Moscow executed in 2014 and 2015). Given the risk of military defeat and the high political price (the West has threatened to treat even a \u201csmall war\u201d as harshly as a full-scale invasion), it\u2019s nearly impossible that the local \u201ccorps\u201d in the Donbas, acting with Russian support, would attempt another small operation in 2022.<\/p>\n<h3 class=\"SimpleBlock-module_h3__2Kv7Y  SimpleBlock-module_center__2rjif\"><strong>Where Ukraine\u2019s military still isn\u2019t strong enough<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p class=\"SimpleBlock-module_p__Q3azD  SimpleBlock-module_center__2rjif\">In their annual assessment of the military capabilities and defense economics of countries worldwide in 2021, experts at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) concluded that upgrading Ukraine\u2019s armed forces to modern weapons has been only partially successful. In some areas, obsolete Soviet equipment is still all Kyiv has. In other words, Ukraine hasn\u2019t recovered completely from the cataclysms of the 1990s and early 2000s, when its military shed much of its soldiers and weapons and combat training declined severely.<\/p>\n<p class=\"SimpleBlock-module_p__Q3azD  SimpleBlock-module_center__2rjif\">Kyiv has struggled to institute reforms with multiple aims:<\/p>\n<p>Synchronizing its army organization principles with NATO countries,Quickly raising the operational capabilities of its troops at the line of contact with Russian-backed forces in the Donbas, andCreating an army that can withstand a Russian invasion.<\/p>\n<p class=\"SimpleBlock-module_p__Q3azD  SimpleBlock-module_center__2rjif\">Ukraine lacks the resources to achieve all these goals at once. IISS experts say the government in Kyiv decided in 2020 to prioritize raising the operational capabilities of its troops along the line of contact in eastern Ukraine, leading to accelerated purchases of Turkish UAVs and similar steps.<\/p>\n<figure class=\"EmbedBlock-module_root__28k9U EmbedBlock-module_cc__1BQ5g EmbedBlock-module_full__1TEjx EmbedBlock-module_proportional__3lAv4\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"data:image\/gif;base64,R0lGODlhAQABAIAAAAAAAP\/\/\/yH5BAEAAAAALAAAAAABAAEAAAIBRAA7\" data-src=\"\/impro\/0KbhnFXKlbjSZZQvtA01iSBi-ZQEDUz5pJSZQiSbneE\/fill\/325\/0\/ce\/1\/aHR0cHM6Ly9tZWR1\/emEuaW8vaW1hZ2Uv\/YXR0YWNobWVudHMv\/aW1hZ2VzLzAwNy80\/MTYvNTgyL29yaWdp\/bmFsL1dVQmRaNkRC\/Qk5kZG05T2RtWmRK\/YVEuanBn.jpg\" class=\"lazyload\" alt=\"Inflated tanks displayed outside the Arsenalna subway station in Kyiv in a protest against the Ukrainian Defense Ministry\u2019s failure to pay for a military order completed by a private firm. December 16, 2021.\"><noscript><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"\/impro\/0KbhnFXKlbjSZZQvtA01iSBi-ZQEDUz5pJSZQiSbneE\/fill\/325\/0\/ce\/1\/aHR0cHM6Ly9tZWR1\/emEuaW8vaW1hZ2Uv\/YXR0YWNobWVudHMv\/aW1hZ2VzLzAwNy80\/MTYvNTgyL29yaWdp\/bmFsL1dVQmRaNkRC\/Qk5kZG05T2RtWmRK\/YVEuanBn.jpg\" alt=\"Inflated tanks displayed outside the Arsenalna subway station in Kyiv in a protest against the Ukrainian Defense Ministry\u2019s failure to pay for a military order completed by a private firm. December 16, 2021.\"><\/noscript>Inflated tanks displayed outside the Arsenalna subway station in Kyiv in a protest against the Ukrainian Defense Ministry\u2019s failure to pay for a military order completed by a private firm. December 16, 2021.Sergey Supinsky \/ AFP \/ Scanpix \/ LETA<\/figure>\n<p class=\"SimpleBlock-module_p__Q3azD  SimpleBlock-module_center__2rjif\">Especially clear during the 2020 economic downturn caused by the coronavirus pandemic, Ukraine has also struggled to build a territorial force reserve.<\/p>\n<p>Ukraine\u2019s current reserve of combat units, comprising veterans of the 2014\u20132015 battles, is ready to reinforce troops in the east if the government declares martial law (reservists belong to specific units so the military can boost these formations to wartime strength if necessary). There\u2019s also a reserve of volunteers that can reinforce paramilitary groups.But forming a reserve deeper in the country, in case of mass mobilization, has proved more difficult. Currently, Ukraine has territorial defense brigades that it started building in 2018. In peacetime, these groups have a handful of officers and contract reservists who undergo periodic training. In wartime, the military would form full-fledged brigades from these formations. Ukraine doesn\u2019t have enough reservists, however, and it\u2019s had problems with their equipment and training, says IISS.<\/p>\n<p class=\"SimpleBlock-module_p__Q3azD  SimpleBlock-module_center__2rjif\">The biggest drawback of reallocating Ukraine\u2019s resources to units fighting in the Donbas has been underinvestment in the country\u2019s aviation, air defense, and navy. These shortcomings could prove critical if Russia executes a large-scale invasion of Ukraine, says retired U.S. Air Force General and former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Philip Breedlove. \u201cYou have a Ukrainian land army that has gotten much better, much more capable,\u201d Breedlove told NBC News last week, before adding, \u201cBut the Russians would own the air and the sea.\u201d<\/p>\n<figure class=\"EmbedBlock-module_root__28k9U EmbedBlock-module_cc__1BQ5g EmbedBlock-module_full__1TEjx EmbedBlock-module_proportional__3lAv4\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"data:image\/gif;base64,R0lGODlhAQABAIAAAAAAAP\/\/\/yH5BAEAAAAALAAAAAABAAEAAAIBRAA7\" data-src=\"\/impro\/uDSJH3KaHz-6Slm5lrYiAc0h0HNULUG11gRcQzcYLnA\/fill\/325\/0\/ce\/1\/aHR0cHM6Ly9tZWR1\/emEuaW8vaW1hZ2Uv\/YXR0YWNobWVudHMv\/aW1hZ2VzLzAwNy80\/MTYvNTc0L29yaWdp\/bmFsL21SdEJZUUhI\/OEdSMGkxZFZCamdY\/NEEuanBn.jpg\" class=\"lazyload\" alt=\"Ukrainian Air Force exercises above Zhytomyr on November 21, 2021\"><noscript><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"\/impro\/uDSJH3KaHz-6Slm5lrYiAc0h0HNULUG11gRcQzcYLnA\/fill\/325\/0\/ce\/1\/aHR0cHM6Ly9tZWR1\/emEuaW8vaW1hZ2Uv\/YXR0YWNobWVudHMv\/aW1hZ2VzLzAwNy80\/MTYvNTc0L29yaWdp\/bmFsL21SdEJZUUhI\/OEdSMGkxZFZCamdY\/NEEuanBn.jpg\" alt=\"Ukrainian Air Force exercises above Zhytomyr on November 21, 2021\"><\/noscript>Ukrainian Air Force exercises above Zhytomyr on November 21, 2021Ukrainian Air Assault Troops Press Service \/ Reuters \/ Scanpix \/ LETA<\/figure>\n<p>Ukraine\u2019s Air Force and Army Aviation suffered heavy losses in 2014 while inflicting relatively minor damage.Without counting the UAVs, Ukraine\u2019s readiness to contest the air hasn\u2019t improved much since 2014. The same is true of Ukrainian pilots: their annual average flight time is half that of Russian pilots. Additionally, most Russian pilots now have practical experience in combat operations over Syria. Given the absolute superiority of Russian aviation and air defense (if Moscow decides to deploy its Air Force openly), the combat value of Ukraine\u2019s new Turkish UAVs is questionable.Ukraine\u2019s Navy (which was decimated after Kyiv\u2019s loss of its bases in Crimea) now consists mainly of Coast Guard cutters received from the United States and other Western countries. This \u201cmosquito fleet\u201d poses no threat to Russia\u2019s Black Sea Fleet. Yes, Ukraine has ordered four missile-armed corvette warships from Turkey, but the first of these vessels won\u2019t be available until 2023.Air defense is another weakness, says the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Late last year, Ukraine reportedly studied ways to obtain new weapons (including a request to the United States for Patriot PAC-3 air-defense systems), but Kyiv\u2019s only realistic means of strengthening its air defenses remains its stockpiles of old Soviet systems on standby since the 2000s.<\/p>\n<p class=\"SimpleBlock-module_p__Q3azD  SimpleBlock-module_center__2rjif\">Consequently, Ukraine would be virtually defenseless against airstrikes and missile attacks by Russia, say Western military analysts.<\/p>\n<h3 class=\"SimpleBlock-module_h3__2Kv7Y  SimpleBlock-module_center__2rjif\">How a full-fledged Russian invasion of Ukraine might unfold<\/h3>\n<figure class=\"EmbedBlock-module_root__28k9U EmbedBlock-module_cc__1BQ5g EmbedBlock-module_default__LSDny\"><\/figure>\n<p class=\"SimpleBlock-module_p__Q3azD  SimpleBlock-module_center__2rjif\">Back in 2015, Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST) expert Mikhail Barabanov said a military operation to \u201cforce Ukraine to peace\u201d might involve airstrikes and missile attacks against Ukraine\u2019s control centers, followed by an invasion of Russian troops converging on the main Ukrainian formations in the Donbas. (Russian forces would attack from Rostov-on-Don and move through Mariupol before turning north, and from north of Kharkiv before turning southeast.) Barabanov said Moscow could deliver another blow \u201cthrough the Sumy and Chernihiv regions, headed directly at Kyiv (but without actually entering Ukraine\u2019s capital) to paralyze completely the enemy\u2019s will to resist and force him to gather all reserves for a hurried defense of Kyiv.\u201d The goal of this operation would be to encircle and destroy all Ukrainian military forces east of the Dnieper, effectively ending the organized resistance of Ukraine\u2019s Armed Forces.<\/p>\n<p class=\"SimpleBlock-module_p__Q3azD  SimpleBlock-module_center__2rjif\">In January 2022, CAST reposted Barabanov\u2019s article on its website, explaining that the text \u201cremains relevant in almost every way and retains its value as a prediction.\u201d<\/p>\n<p class=\"SimpleBlock-module_p__Q3azD  SimpleBlock-module_center__2rjif\">American experts, including retired army generals, have come to similar conclusions, arguing that Moscow might first encircle Ukraine\u2019s Armed Forces in the east, thereby eliminating the country\u2019s military potential. The goal of such an operation would not be the occupation of major cities or the seizure of territory. Alternatively, Moscow could use its navy to blockade Ukrainian ports while executing a series of small attacks along the line of contact in the Donbas, continuing these actions until the West makes significant concessions to Russia.<\/p>\n<p class=\"SimpleBlock-module_p__Q3azD  SimpleBlock-module_center__2rjif\">Scholars at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) mapped an analogous scenario where Russia encircles the Ukrainian Army and then strangles the nation\u2019s economy by restricting access to its biggest cities \u2014 all without occupying or seizing additional Ukrainian soil. Moscow\u2019s troops would likely advance along railways in eastern Ukraine in order to avoid supply difficulties, write the experts at CSIS.<\/p>\n<p class=\"SimpleBlock-module_p__Q3azD  SimpleBlock-module_center__2rjif\">A strategy of \u201cpunishment\u201d without occupation could allow the Kremlin to avoid a costly protracted war against Ukrainian resistance fighters. This strategy has an important limitation, however: the cost of attacking Ukraine (in the form of significantly escalated sanctions by the West) could prove to be too great to justify a military campaign that promises no material compensation.<\/p>\n<p class=\"MaterialNote-module_note_caption__1ezSo\">Text by <strong>Dmitry Kuznets<\/strong><\/p>\n<p class=\"MaterialNote-module_note_credit__PuFyX\">Translation by <strong>Kevin Rothrock<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><!--noindex--><a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" href=\"http:\/\/meduza.io\/en\/feature\/2022\/01\/19\/2014-vs-2022\">Source<\/a><!--\/noindex--><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Ukrainian military drills outside Kyiv on December 25, 2021Sergey Supinsky \/ AFP \/ Scanpix \/ LETA After last week\u2019s talks between Russia, the United States, and NATO led to no apparent breakthroughs on European security, speculation has resumed in the West that Moscow is preparing an expanded invasion of Ukraine that could begin at any [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":6289,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"fifu_image_url":"\/impro\/0HwP4wyRYrfiXaXz55CsKFKPSfhhlsjzbB2S7Vn9j8Q\/fill\/325\/0\/ce\/1\/aHR0cHM6Ly9tZWR1\/emEuaW8vaW1hZ2Uv\/YXR0YWNobWVudHMv\/aW1hZ2VzLzAwNy80\/MTYvNTk4L29yaWdp\/bmFsL1RHMHJZYWxh\/TTJMZm5mU3hiMDBj\/UHcuanBn.jpg","fifu_image_alt":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[87],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-6288","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-latest-news-from-russia"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v28.6 - 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